Dynamic awareness and zero probability beliefs

Theory and Decision 83 (3):309-313 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this note, it is shown that in a Bayesian model with unawareness of impossible, or vanishingly improbable, events, awareness can only change after such an improbable event has actually been observed.

Categories

Add categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/s11238-016-9580-x

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,038

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time.Darren Bradley - 2013 - In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago.
Formal Models of Awareness.Thomas Ågotnes & Natasha Alechina - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):105-106.
Probability logic of finitely additive beliefs.Chunlai Zhou - 2010 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):247-282.
A theory of probability.T. V. Reeves - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):161-182.
Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness.Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):143-164.
Beliefs in conditionals vs. conditional beliefs.Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Topoi 26 (1):115-132.
An appraisal of comparative probability.Vincenzo Fano - unknown
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life.Philippe Rochat - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):717-731.
Weak Bayesian coherentism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Synthese 157 (3):337-346.
Can beliefs correspond to reality?Howard Darmstadter - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (10):302-314.
Semantics for Knowledge and Change of Awareness.Hans van Ditmarsch & Tim French - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):169-195.
Awareness Dynamics.Brian Hill - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):113-137.
Interpretations of Probability.Weimin Sun - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
Can reliabilists believe in subjective probability?Peter Baumann - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):199-200.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-07

Downloads
19 (#800,531)

6 months
5 (#641,756)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Quiggin
University of Queensland

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references