Why is it no longer Possible to Build a Formal Ontology as a Mereotopology?

In The Philosophy of Aristotle (2019)
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Abstract

This brief paper aims to underline which are the philosophical limits of mereotopology, when one takes it as a basic unitary theoretical framework for formal ontology. Mereotopology is a first-order theory of the relations among wholes, parts and the boundaries between parts, that combines mereological and topological concepts. Nowadays, with the expression “formal ontology” one intends either the computational (engineering) version, or the philosophical (categorial) one. It is important, then, to avoid terminological confusions. The main philosophical reason that keeps me from developing the connection between computational and philosophical formal ontologies on mereotopological basis is the following: anti-Representationalism and Monism are two ontological stances very difficult to join together, as mereotopology does, if one takes into account the ontological implications of the emerging dynamical dual paradigm in the information theoretic approach to quantum physics. In general, it is this approach to the current fundamental and experimentally extremely successful physical theories about the microphysical realm, namely Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Field Theory, that allows to overcome the “gap” between the two disciplinary fields of formal ontology, making information a physical magnitude. I do not oppose anti-Representationalism, but its connection with the monistic stance, because of the fact that nowadays information appears as a basic component of the microphysical realm just like energy-matter. This fact justifies a realistic but information-matter dual ontology as the proper formal ontology of the emerging paradigm in the information theoretic approach to contemporary quantum physics. The primacy that Aristotle gives to the theory of principle (act/potency) as to the theory of categories is a very helpful tool to solve the main question that arises within a realistic dual ontological theoretical framework: the question of the non-stable nature of the categories, that reflect the increasingly complexity of the physical dynamic realistic orders. Here is the importance of an historical approach to the topic, given also the fact that mereological formal ontology originates with the works of three authors (Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl) that studied, directly or indirectly, Aristotle’s ontology.

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Martina Properzi
Pontifical Lateran University Of Rome (Alumnus)

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