Abstract

Karl Jaspers was influential in the phenomenological psychopathology movement. Contemporary phenomenological scholarship provides fruitful propositions in psychopathology as well as renewed recognition of Jaspers’ pioneering works. This paper is an attempt to give a more general account on how Jaspers’ oeuvre stands in face of contemporary phenomenological scholarship, outlining the intersections between them. Both poles critic the reductionism of consciousness, affirm the necessary relationship with the sciences and philosophy as well as the training and effort that the field demands. Disagreements are related to Jaspersian’ restricted use of phenomenology. We claim that Jaspers provides an interesting model of applying phenomenology in psychopathology that is scientifically robust without losing the due primacy of experience in both conceptual and clinical developments. We recognize Jaspers` limitations on the development of phenomenology, nevertheless we consider that one should go with Jaspers in his rigorous descriptions, scientific endeavors, philosophical groundings, and also beyond him, emphasizing the structures of consciousness in its embodied, temporal and intersubjective features.