Do normative standards advance our understanding of moral judgment?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):558-559 (2005)
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Abstract

Sunstein's review of research on moral heuristics is rich and informative – even without his central claim that individuals often commit moral errors. We question the value of positing such a normative moral framework for the study of moral judgment. We also propose an alternative standard for evaluating moral judgments – that of subjective rationality.

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David Pizarro
Cornell University

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