Moral heuristics or moral competence? Reflections on Sunstein

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):557-558 (2005)
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Abstract

By focusing on mistaken judgments, Sunstein provides a theory of performance errors without a theory of moral competence. Additionally, Sunstein's objections to thought experiments like the footbridge and trolley problems are unsound. Exotic and unfamiliar stimuli are used in theory construction throughout the cognitive sciences, and these problems enable us to uncover the implicit structure of our moral intuitions.

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