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Are Prototypes and Exemplars Used in Distinct Cognitive Processes?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):226-227 (2010)
Abstract
Machery’s argument that concepts split into different kinds is bold and inspiring but not fully persuasive. We will focus on the lack of evidence for the fourth tenet of Machery’s..Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids.Collin Rice - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):597-619.
Language, Mind, and Cognitive Science: Remarks on Theories of the Language-Cognition Relationships in Human Minds.Guillaume Beaulac - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
References found in this work
In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond.Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond.Jonathan St Evans & Keith Frankish - 2010 - Critica 42 (125):104-114.
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