Higher-Level concepts and their heterogeneous implementations: A polemical review of Edouard Machery's Doing Without Concepts

Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):119-133 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper offers a critical review of Edouard Machery's Doing Without Concepts, with a particular emphasis on an approach to concept individuation that is consistent with many of Machery's arguments but has the potential to avoid his eliminativist conclusion. The approach agrees with Machery's claims to the effect that prototypes, exemplars, theories (and so on) form a heterogeneous class, but construes these theoretical entities as implementing a unified, albeit coarse-grained, notion of a concept

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,867

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-15

Downloads
61 (#257,063)

6 months
10 (#383,927)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kevan Edwards
Syracuse University

Citations of this work

From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):19-38.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Jerry A. Fodor.
Proper names.John R. Searle - 1958 - Mind 67 (266):166-173.

View all 12 references / Add more references