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Similar books and articles
Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena.Peter Carruthers - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 61-85.
Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap".Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.
Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
Evolution, Consciousness, and the Internality of Mind.Jim Hopkins - 2000 - In P. Carruthers & A. Chamberlen (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition. Cambridge University Press. pp. 276.
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Reductive explanation, concepts, and a priori entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.
Evolution, Consciousness, and the Internality of the Mind.James Hopkins - 2000 - In Peter Carruthers & A. Chamberlain (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition. Cambridge University Press. pp. 276.
The evolution of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - In Peter Carruthers & A. Chamberlain (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition. Cambridge University Press. pp. 254.
Beyond evolution: human nature and the limits of evolutionary explanation.Anthony O'Hear - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Why should our mind-reading abilities be involved in the explanation of phenomenal consciousness?Diana I. Pérez - 2008 - Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):35-84.
Identity-Based Reduction and Reductive Explanation.Raphael van Riel - 2010 - Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1-2):183-219.
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