- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation
Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61 (2001)
Abstract
Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes . Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say noAuthor Profiles
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- consc.net
(no proxy) - consc.net [2] (no proxy)
- links.jstor.org (no proxy)
- philreview.dukejournals.org (no proxy)
- philreview.dukejournals.org [2] (no proxy)
- philreview.dukejournals.org [3] (no proxy)
- jstor.org (no proxy)
- jstor.org [2] (no proxy)
- jstor.org [3] (no proxy)
- pdcnet.org (no proxy)
- pdcnet.org [2] (no proxy)
- read.dukeupress.edu (no proxy)
- read.dukeupress.edu [2] (no proxy)
- jstor.org [4] (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Reductive explanation, concepts, and a priori entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.
A priori entailment and conceptual analysis: Making room for type-c physicalism.J. L. Dowell - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):93 – 111.
Consciousness and Reduction.Ausonio Marras - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):335-361.
Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap".Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.
Analytics
Added to PP
n/a
Downloads
2,250 (#4,781)
6 months
113 (#47,778)
n/a
Downloads
2,250 (#4,781)
6 months
113 (#47,778)
Historical graph of downloads
Author Profiles
Citations of this work
Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Ted A. Warfield & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.
The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 55-140.
Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.
Strong and weak emergence.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Philip Clayton & Paul Davies (eds.), The re-emergence of emergence: the emergentist hypothesis from science to religion. New York: Oxford University Press.
The components of content.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-7cb8d487df-skz2k uwo