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Choosing for Changing Selves
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2019)
Abstract
What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives. Richard Pettigrew presents a theory of rational decision making for agents who recognise that their values will change over time and whose decisions will affect those future times.Author's Profile
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Choosing for Changing Selves. [REVIEW]David Strohmaier - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):675-678.
Review of Richard Pettigrew’s Choosing for Changing Selves - Richard Pettigrew, Choosing for Changing Selves. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2020), 272 pp., $72.00 (hardcover; also available as an e-book). [REVIEW]Susanne Burri - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):398-401.
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Citations of this work
Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
The Normative Standard for Future Discounting.Craig Callender - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):227-253.
Welfare comparisons within and across species.Heather Browning - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):529-551.
Transformative experience and the principle of informed consent in medicine.Karl Egerton & Helen Capitelli-McMahon - 2023 - Synthese 202 (3):1-21.
Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
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