Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning

Philosophia 40 (1):75-97 (2012)

Abstract

There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any narrow sense for it encompasses a much broader spectrum of approaches to meaning, connected with the Wittgensteinian and especially Sellarsian view of language as an essentially rule-governed enterprise; and indeed I refrain from claiming that the version of inferentialism I present here is in every detail the version developed by Brandom

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References found in this work

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.William P. Alston - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.
Problems of the Self.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work

The Normativity of Meaning and Content.Kathrin Glüer & Asa Wikforss - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Delocalized Mind. Judgements, Vehicles, and Persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.
Meaning-Constitutive Inferences.Matej Drobňák - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24 (1):85-104.
Assessing Concept Possession as an Explicit and Social Practice.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 51 (4):801-816.

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