Hume, History and the Science of Human Nature

Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada) (2002)
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Abstract

This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc. ;Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."

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Darío Perinetti
Université du Québec à Montreal

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