Fitch and intuitionistic knowability

Analysis 50 (3):182-187 (1990)
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10.1093/analys/50.3.182

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Philip Percival
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Fitch's proof, verificationism, and the knower paradox.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends.Heinrich Wansing - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):591-612.
Intuitionistic epistemic logic.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):266-298.

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