What is Truth?

Abstract

On this particular issue about ¨truth¨, I´d rather focus more on the specific problematization of ¨sentential truth¨. In other words, I will not be concerned with the truth of an event or an experience per se in the objective, intersubjective or subjective sense. In the present consideration, I´d be more concentrated on the truth of beliefs uttered in meaningful statements. This distinctively philosophical approach—in the linguistic-analytic tradition—is supportive of the intent to determine whether certain beliefs are matters of knowledge or not with respect to how classical philosophy presupposes that ONLY true beliefs achieve the category of knowledge. In this sense, the question of being true or the problem of truth plays an intrinsic function in the technical aspect of philosophy mainly in the discipline of epistemology (the philosophical field that deals with the issue of knowledge). In the most fundamental formulation, knowledge is defined as true belief. To resolve whether a belief is true or not, it has to be initially articulated in a sensible statement and must finally pass the test of verification.

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