Steering away from multiple realization

Adaptive Behavior 28 (1):29-30 (2020)
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Abstract

Mario Villalobos and Pablo Razeto-Barry argue that enactivists should understand living beings not as autopoietic systems, but as autopoietic bodies. In doing so, they surrender the principle of multiple realizability of the spatial location of living beings. By way of counterexample, I argue that more motivation is required before this principle is surrendered.

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Anco Peeters
Radboud University