The self saves the day! Value pluralism, autonomous belief and the dissolution of the value problem through the encroachment of the self on knowledge

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his book Autonomous Knowledge J. Adam Carter argues that the possibility of radical cognitive enhancement shows the need for epistemology to be significantly updated. Reflection on the possibility of such enhancement shows that doxastic autonomy matters. If a belief fails to be autonomous, it cannot qualify as knowledge. Sects. 1-3 of this paper introduce the key components of Carter's autonomy framework and his considerations on the value of knowledge (including his proposed solution to the value problem, i.e. the challenge of accounting for why knowledge has greater value than any of its proper parts). Sects. 4-7 offer a critical appraisal of Carter's framework. We are not convinced that Carter has succeeded in showing that there is an autonomous belief condition on knowledge. In this paper, however, we shall not engage with this issue. Instead, for the sake of our critical discussion, we shall assume that autonomous belief is a condition on knowledge and engage Carter on a cluster of issues concerning axiology.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Extended knowledge and autonomous belief.Duncan Pritchard - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Partially Autonomous Belief.Lukas Schwengerer - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):207–221.
Epistemic pluralism.J. Adam Carter & Anne-Kathrin Koch - 2020 - In A. Bitoni, P. Harris, C. S. Fleisher & A. K. Binderkrantz (eds.), The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs.
Pluralism about Knowledge.Robin McKenna - 2017 - In Coliva Annalisa & Pedersen Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 171-198.
Knowledge: Value on the Cheap.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):249-263.
Intrusión pragmática y valor epistémico.Pascal Engel - 2011 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 23 (1):25-51.
Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment.Jie Gao - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
Epistemic Value.John Greco & Luis Pinto De Sa - 2018 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Die Autonomie der Person.Peter Baumann - 2000 - Paderborn: mentis.
Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-05-16

Downloads
9 (#1,260,533)

6 months
9 (#320,050)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
Rethinking intrinsic value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
An internalist externalism.William P. Alston - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.

View all 19 references / Add more references