Epistemic Value Monism and the Swamping Problem

Ratio 29 (3):283-297 (2016)
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Abstract

Many deontologists explain the epistemic value of justification in terms of its instrumental role in promoting truth – the original source of value in the epistemic domain. The swamping problem for truth monism appears to make this position indefensible, at least for those monists who maintain the superiority of knowledge to merely true belief. I propose a new solution to the swamping problem that allows monists to maintain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over merely true belief. My trick is to deny the swamping premise itself.

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Scott Stapleford
St. Thomas University

Citations of this work

Intraspecies impermissivism.Scott Stapleford - 2018 - Episteme 16 (3):340-356.
All swamping, no problem.Joseph Bjelde - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):205-211.
The Value Problem of A Priori Knowledge.David Botting - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (2):229-252.

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