Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):51-68 (2017)

Fergus Peace
Oxford University
Consequentialists claim that their theory is simply that the right action is whichever one will lead to the best state of affairs - and that this formulation provides a powerful intuitive ground for accepting consequentialism. Recent arguments in value theory threaten to show that this formulation lacks either coherent meaning, because states of affairs cannot be good simpliciter, or philosophical power, because their goodness provides no reason to bring them about. I respond to two such arguments - from Judith Jarvis Thomson and Richard Kraut - contending that none can be made to work in a way which undercuts consequentialism's simple formulation.
Keywords goodness  consequentialism  value theory  meta-ethics  ethics  Judith Jarvis Thomson  normativity
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-016-9553-x
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References found in this work BETA

Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine Korsgaard - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the Good Life. Oup Usa.
Rights, Goals, and Fairness.T. M. Scanlon - 1977 - Erkenntnis 11 (1):81 - 95.
Objectivism and Relational Good.Connie S. Rosati - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):314-349.
Goodness.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):467-475.
Normativity.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):744-753.

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