Towards a Self-Definition of Naturalism

Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 21:7-26 (2023)
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Abstract

Naturalism is the philosophical thesis that holds the following assumptions: the rejection of the supernatural and the transcendent; the acceptance of science as knowledge of high epistemic value, for some philosophers it is the only valid knowledge, and the rejection of all first or a priori philosophy. The problem addressed is that prima facie it seems problematic to explain the theses of naturalism without violating some of its assumptions. This paper will show that, starting from liberal naturalism and the notions of niche construction, as well as some theses of the articulation of thought through language, it is possible to define naturalism without defending premises that violate its methodology.

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