Rational Requirements and Reasoning

Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):513-528 (2014)
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Abstract

This critical note concerns John Broome's bookRationality through Reasoning(2013). Broome claims that rationality amounts to satisfying rational requirements as opposed to responding correctly to reasons. My critique focuses on two issues. First, I try to show that Broome's account of rational requirements, in particular his answer to the so-called ‘symmetry-problem’, presupposes that responding correctly to reasons is part of rationality. Secondly, in discussing Broome's account of reasoning I criticize his claim that first-order reasoning involves no appeal to reasons and, hence, no normative thoughts on behalf of the reasoner.

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Herlinde Pauer-Studer
University of Vienna

Citations of this work

Inferring as a way of knowing.Nicholas Koziolek - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 7):1563-1582.
Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated.Andreas Müller - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (1):2-15.

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References found in this work

Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.

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