The Mere Addition Paradox

In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (1984)
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Abstract

Argues whether an outcome could be made worse by the mere addition of extra people who have lives worth living;why we should reject the view that it is best if the average quality of life is as high as possible. It discusses a paradox involving mere addition and the attempted solutions. It also explores new versions of this paradox.

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Derek Parfit
Last affiliation: Oxford University

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