More trouble for regular probabilitites

Abstract

In standard probability theory, probability zero is not the same as impossibility. But many have suggested that only impossible events should have probability zero. This can be arranged if we allow infinitesimal probabilities, but infinitesimals do not solve all of the problems. We will see that regular probabilities are not invariant over rigid transformations, even for simple, bounded, countable, constructive, and disjoint sets. Hence, regular chances cannot be determined by space-time invariant physical laws, and regular credences cannot satisfy seemingly reasonable symmetry principles. Moreover, the examples here are immune to the objections against Williamson’s infinite coin flips.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-21.
Weintraub’s response to Williamson’s coin flip argument.Matthew W. Parker - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-21.
Infinitesimal Probabilities.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 199-265.
Probability, Regularity, and Cardinality.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):231-240.
Non-Archimedean Probability.Vieri Benci, Leon Horsten & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2013 - Milan Journal of Mathematics 81 (1):121-151.
Infinitesimal Probabilities.Vieri Benci, Leon Horsten & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):509-552.
Underdetermination of Imprecise Probabilities.Joshua Thong - 2022 - Dissertation, Australian National University

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-03-13

Downloads
616 (#2,414)

6 months
119 (#148,485)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matthew Parker
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-21.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.

View all 35 references / Add more references