Abstract
Contemporary philosophers—one may mention in particular Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams—have drawn attention to the phenomenon of moral luck. Moral luck, as distinct from luck in an unqualified sense, has a bearing on the way in which people’s attributes and acts are assessed morally. More specifically, it has a bearing on the way in which people are praised or blamed, rewarded or punished. The issue involved is usually stated in terms of blame or punishment, though it could also be stated in terms of praise and reward; luck can be good as well as bad. For convenience, I will concentrate on blame and punishment. It seems evident that a person cannot justly be punished or blamed for what is outside his control; it also seems evident that to call something a matter of luck is to say that it is outside the control of the person involved. Yet there are many cases of moral luck; that is, cases in which luck plays an important part in the acts or characteristics for which a person is blamed or punished. Nagel distinguishes four types of such luck. There is constitutive luck, where this relates to “the kind of person you are, where this is not just a question of what you deliberately do, but of your inclinations, capacities and temperament.” There is luck in the way in which a person is determined by antecedent circumstances, which make a man the kind of person he is. There is luck in one’s circumstances, i.e., the kinds of problems and situations one faces. Finally, there is luck in the way one’s actions turn out: for example, a motorist may have done all that is normally necessary to stop his car, but due to faulty brakes runs over a child.