Algo-Rhythms and the Beat of the Legal Drum

Philosophy and Technology 31 (4):507-524 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper focuses on concerns and legal challenges brought on by the use of algorithms. A particular class of algorithms that augment or replace analysis and decision-making by humans, i.e. data analytics and machine learning, is under scrutiny. Taking into account Balkin’s work on “the laws of an algorithmic society”, attention is drawn to obligations of transparency, matters of due process, and accountability. This US-centric analysis on drawbacks and loopholes of current legal systems is complemented with the analysis of norms and principles of the EU data protection law, or “GDPR”. The aim is twofold. On the one hand, the intent is to shed light on some crucial differences between the US and EU law on the regulation of algorithmic operators, both public and private. Whereas, in the USA, scholars debate whether and to what extent new duties and responsibilities of algorithmic operators, e.g. information fiduciaries, have to amend the current framework of self-regulation and light government—as shown by the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy report from November 2016—in EU law much of the new duties and responsibilities of algorithmic operators have been passed upon them as data controllers. Whether such approaches will successfully tackle the normative challenges of the algorithmic society is, on the other hand, an open issue that will likely represent the main topic of debate over the next years. Disagreement may concern: the terms framing the legal question in e.g. statistical purposes of the data processing; how such terms are related to each other in legal reasoning ; and legal hard cases that will increasingly have to do with the principles that are at stake also but not only in data protection. By entrusting such legal hard cases to algorithms, or some sort of smart artificial agent, humans still bear full responsibility for the judgment of what is socially, ethically, and legally “plain” and “hard” in social affairs. The balance between delegation of decisions to algorithms and non-delegation will be the leitmotiv of the algorithmic society. Since the devil is in the detail, the current paper is devoted to some of them.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,779

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Democratizing Algorithmic Fairness.Pak-Hang Wong - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 33 (2):225-244.
Algorithmic Regulation.Karen Yeung & Martin Lodge (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
Algorithmic Regulation.Karen Yeung & Martin Lodge (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
Non-empirical problems in fair machine learning.Teresa Scantamburlo - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (4):703-712.
Algorithmic Accountability In the Making.Deborah G. Johnson - 2021 - Social Philosophy and Policy 38 (2):111-127.
The Governance of AI and Its Legal Context-Dependency.Ugo Pagallo - 2021 - In Josh Cowls & Jessica Morley (eds.), The 2020 Yearbook of the Digital Ethics Lab. Springer Verlag. pp. 57-68.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-13

Downloads
30 (#521,169)

6 months
5 (#838,466)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
The concept of law.Hla Hart - 1961 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
The ethics of information.Luciano Floridi - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 15 references / Add more references