The Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity

In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Clarendon Press. pp. 242 (2006)

Abstract

One of the main problems of personal identity is supposed to be how we relate to our bodies. A few philosophers endorse what is called a 'bodily criterion of personal identity': they say that we are our bodies, or at any rate that our identity over time consists in the identity of our bodies. Many more deny this--typically on the grounds that we can imagine ourselves coming apart from our bodies. But both sides agree that the bodily criterion is an important view which anyone thinking about personal identity must consider.

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Author's Profile

Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield

References found in this work

Language, Truth, and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - Philosophy 23 (85):173-176.
The Human Animal. Personal identity without psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 192 (1):112-113.
The Human Animal.Tamar Szabo Gendler & Eric T. Olson - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):112.

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Citations of this work

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Unrestricted Animalism and the Too Many Candidates Problem.Eric Yang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):635-652.
Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem.Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.

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