Corroborating testimony and ignorance: A reply to Bovens, Fitelson, Hartmann and Snyder

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):565-572 (2002)
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Abstract

In an earlier paper, I objected to certain elements of L. Jonathan Cohen's account of corroborating testimony (Olsson [2002]). In their response to my article, Bovens, Fitelson, Hartmann and Snyder ([2002]) suggest some significant improvements of the probabilistic model which I used in assessing Cohen's theses and answer some additional questions which my study raised. More problematically, they also seek to defend Cohen against my criticism. I argue, in this reply, that their attempts in this direction are unsuccessful.

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Erik J. Olsson
Lund University

References found in this work

Corroborating testimony, probability and surprise.Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):273-288.
The Probable and the Provable.Alan R. White - 1979 - Philosophical Quarterly 29 (114):89-90.
What is necessary for testimonial corroboration?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1982 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):161-164.

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