Abstract
Richard Rorty thinks that Martin Heidegger is necessarily impaled on the horns of a dilemma in regard to the history and historicity of Being. The thrust of Rorty's criticism of Heidegger is aimed at the supposed vacuity of Heidegger's thought of Being without beings. In order to overcome this vacuity, Rorty thinks that Heidegger has recourse to the history of beings. But the form ordinary history takes for Rorty's Heidegger is the alienated form of the history of philosophy. The criticism thus has three steps. First, Being without being is a vacuous notion. Second, this vacuity is overcome through a consideration of the history of philosophy. That is, Heidegger might be equally unable to determine the truth of Being without recourse to his version of the history of philosophy. Rorty's criticism of Heidegger in regard to the possibility for thinking at the end of philosophy is coordinated with a second criticism.