Kant Studien 108 (1):1-18 (2017)

Michael Oberst
Humboldt-University, Berlin (PhD)
There is a disagreement in Kant scholarship concerning the question whether phenomenal substance contains a substantial that is the first subject of all accidents and relations. I would like to argue in this paper that the disagreement stems from the overlooking of a development of Kant’s views. Having abandoned his Physical Monadology, Kant first rejected the substantiality of matter because of its infinite divisibility. But in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science his view is that matter is substance and at the same time infinitely divisible.
Keywords Materie  Kant  Kategorie  Substanz
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DOI 10.1515/kant-2017-0005
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