Abstract

The purpose of this inquiry is to better understand Martin Heidegger’s principle of sufficient reason as discussed during the 1955-56 lecture-cycle, entitled Der Satz vom Grund. Here Heidegger dealt with such ideas as weil, Weile, verweilen, which all denote stillness, contemplation and an acknowledgment of “what is as it is”. He set these ideas against reason’s need for _expression. This need appears in the idea of Weil as a “cause”, also in the conjunctive “because”. The verbs weile, weilen denote enduring time of introspection and self-assessment, as in in sich innehalten, in der Ruhe. Heidegger’s Weil introduces a tautological understanding of the man-world relation, which includes fearful astonishment about everything that is, not because its nature is not always known, but because of its sheer existence. Suppressing this astonishment would result in a non-awareness of the authentic meaning of something that is itself, fed by such terms as cause and reason, and ultimately the technical thinking apparent in the term Ge-Stell. Heidegger supported his views with references to the concepts of first beginning and the Greek astonishment . They aid the search for certainly of knowledge, which ultimately comes to fruition in Leibniz’s “principle of sufficient reasoning.” In this search, to avoid the constant need for reasoning and to best value “that what is, as it is”, a mental jump is needed, a jump not toward to abyss but a jump beneath thinking in terms of reason, to that level where man finds himself, where identity becomes itself Ereignis. And Ereignis is the main structure in Heidegger’s thinking, following the so-called Kehre. The present research aims at unvailing and enforcing the Denken-Sein-Sprache triad as the key to understanding Heidegger’s late philosophical thinking