The illusion of mechanism: Mechanistic fundamentalism or enlightenment?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):208-209 (2011)
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Abstract

Rather than worrying about Bayesian Fundamentalists, I suggest that our real concern should be with Mechanistic Fundamentalists; that is, those who believe that concrete, but frequently untestable mechanisms, should be at the heart of all cognitive theories

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