The Ideal of the Completeness of Calculi of Inductive Inference: An Introductory Guide to its Failure

Abstract

Non-trivial calculi of inductive inference are incomplete. This result is demonstrated formally elsewhere. Here the significance and background to the result is described. This note explains what is meant by incompleteness, why it is desirable, if only it could be secured, and it gives some indication of the arguments needed to establish its failure. The discussion will be informal, using illustrative examples rather than general results. Technical details and general proofs are presented in Norton.

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John D. Norton
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

A Demonstration of the Incompleteness of Calculi of Inductive Inference.John D. Norton - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1119-1144.

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References found in this work

A material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
Theory of Probability.Harold Jeffreys - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (2):263-264.
Theory of Probability.Harold Jeffreys - 1939 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Ignorance and Indifference.John D. Norton - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (1):45-68.
Deductively Definable Logics of Induction.John D. Norton - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):617-654.

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