The epistemic value of doombehaviour: beyond the prudential consequences of doomscrolling, doomchecking, and doomsurfing

Synthese 203 (6):1-25 (2024)
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Abstract

This paper analyses a novel and increasingly prevalent category of epistemic behaviour: _doombehaviour_, constituted by the popular phenomena of _doomscrolling_ and _doomsurfing_, as well as _doomchecking_, which is introduced in this paper. Doombehaviour, referring to the frequent or immersive online consumption of negatively valenced news, became ubiquitous during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. As this behaviour has since then been found to negatively impact mood and mental health, advice has been to minimise doombehaviour or even limit news consumption altogether. Yet, as I argue, this assessment overlooks the importance of the epistemic motivation instantiating the behaviour. By presenting an analysis of doomscrolling, doomsurfing, and doomchecking within the context of our socio-technical environment, arguing for the distinct instrumental epistemic values of these categories of doombehaviour, this paper provides more nuanced advice for individuals seeking to balance the potential epistemic benefits and prudential costs of this behaviour. Epistemically motivated individuals should refrain from doomscrolling due to the risk of consuming sophisticated misinformation. However, within the parameters presented in this paper, the epistemic goods obtained through doomchecking and doomsurfing may justify the prudential costs for individuals motivated to acquire knowledge of, or be informed about, current events. This discussion opens the door to further explorations of these increasingly prevalent and potentially harmful epistemic behaviours that have, so far, been ignored by the discipline.

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2024-06-02

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Mara Neijzen
University of Edinburgh

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