Abstract

This thesis aims to challenge the position of a philosopher who thinks that claiming to have a "fictionalist attitude" towards, for example, mathematics, allows him, under certain conditions, both to maintain that mathematics is not true and to use it as one ordinarily would, without offering a paraphrase for it or regarding it as mere symbol-manipulation. The motivation for this position runs along the following lines. Mathematics purports to refer to numbers. Positing existence of such entities is deemed undesirable. Nevertheless, abandoning mathematics altogether is not feasible, and giving a metaphysically attractive paraphrase---exceedingly difficult. Although the proponent of this position is aware of the potential charge of "doublethink" associated with similar views, he does not see his account as vulnerable insofar it satisfies certain conditions. ;The problem presented in this dissertation for such an approach is intended to be quite general. Although we talk mainly about numbers, it is simply for ease of exposition. ;First of all, it can't be too easy to claim to not believe a given content---this can't be a philosopher's ticket to the kind of wholesale scepticism that appears to simply shift the meanings of the words. In order to avoid that, however, one is obliged to give an account of the avowed "fictionalist attitude" which would make it clear that this attitude couldn't simply replace belief more or less across the board. In facing this challenge, one finds that while the contrast between this attitude and genuine belief is easy to account for in a range of familiar cases, still, in cases of philosophical interest , it becomes difficult to make sense of the contrast. To substantiate these claims, a number of tentative accounts are considered, and it is shown that for each one there comes a point when the contrast "collapses". In light of that discussion it becomes prima facie plausible to suppose that there simply is no contrast to be drawn for, e.g. , one's attitude to numbers. The implications of this are very briefly considered in the final chapter