Authors
Abstract
Few contributions in the field of metaphysics can be compared, for their depth and impact, to the work of the American philosopher David K. Lewis. A feature of this work, which partly explain its great appeal, is its systematicity. Lewis’s views on intrinsicality, naturalness, supervenience, mind and modality, to mention just a few themes, constitute a unified and connected body of doctrines. As Lewis himself acknowledged in the introduction to the first volume of collected papers: “I should have liked to be a piecemeal, unsystematic philosopher, offering independent proposals on a variety of topics. It was not to be”. Surely there is an element of beauty in this systematicity. But there is also an element of precariousness. For a body of doctrines has some vital organs: claims or assumptions that are so central to the life of the system that, if one were to reject them, the system as a whole would likely collapse. This seems to be true, in particular, of Lewis’s metaphysical system. What I present here are two investigations concerning, respectively, the problem of ontic vagueness and the existence of a fundamental level. I believe that the evaluation of these two issues is of vital importance for assessing the tenability of Lewis’s systematic metaphysics. There is a general worry lurking behind my discussion, which it’s worth making explicit here. The worry is that, if the justification for Lewis’s claims on ontic vagueness and fundamentality turned out to be wanting or otherwise unsatisfactory, and if I am right to think that these theses are part of a number of central claims constituting the basis of his metaphysical system, then it seems we should start being suspicious of the very tenability of the Lewisian metaphysics as a whole. What I will be arguing for in the two main chapters of this dissertation provides, in my view, enough material for a modest defense of Lewis’s views on ontic vagueness and fundamentality. I will clarify the content of this modest defense, and explain its significance for the development of the contemporary debate in metaphysics, as well as for a redefinition of a kind of Lewisian metaphysics, in a brief note at the end of the introduction.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,410
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Lewis's Philosophical Method.Daniel Nolan - 2015 - In B. Loewer & J. Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to Lewis. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 25-39.
David Lewis.Daniel Patrick Nolan - 2005 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis.Frank Jackson & Graham Priest (eds.) - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology: Volume 2.David Lewis - 1999 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis.Frank Jackson & Graham Priest (eds.) - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
Lewisian Quidditism, Humility, and Diffidence.Benjamin Curtis - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3081-3099.
Lewis' Strawman.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):55-65.
David Lewis on Persistence.Katherine Hawley - forthcoming - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 237-49.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-09-11

Total views
16 ( #668,745 of 2,519,809 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,314 of 2,519,809 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes