Can Retributivism and Risk Assessment Be Reconciled?

Criminal Justice Ethics (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this paper we explore whether or not the use of risk assessment tools in criminal sentencing can be made compatible with a retributivist justification of punishment. While there has been considerable discussion of the accuracy and fairness of these tools, such discussion assumes that one’s recidivism risk is relevant to the severity of punishment that one should receive. But this assumption only holds on certain accounts of punishment, and seems to conflict with retributivist justifications of punishment. Drawing on the broader desert literature, we explain the source of this conflict, and suggest that a retributivist approach on which the severity of punishment partly depends on one’s character in addition to their acts offers some hope of reconciling retributivism with the use of risk assessment tools in considerations of sentencing reduction in particular. Ultimately, however, even this limited attempt at reconciliation fails, so long as risk assessment tools fail to distinguish between risk that one is responsible for, and risk that one is not responsible for.

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Author Profiles

Hanna Gunn
University of California, Merced
Toby Napoletano
University of California, Merced

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Justice, deviance, and the dark ghetto.Tommie Shelby - 2007 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (2):126–160.

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