Four theories of amodal perception

Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (2007)
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Abstract

We are aware of those parts of a cat that are occluded behind a fence. The question is how we represent these occluded parts of perceived objects: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider four theories and compare their explanatory power: (i) we see them, (ii) we have nonperceptual beliefs about them, (iii) we have immediate perceptual access to them and (iv) we visualize them. I point out that the first three of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I argue for the fourth account, according to which we visualize the occluded parts of perceived objects. Finally, I consider some important consequences of this view with regards to the content and the evolution of visualization.

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Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp

Citations of this work

The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming.Jennifer M. Windt - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.

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References found in this work

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
Image and Mind.Stephen Michael Kosslyn - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Christoph Hoerl.
Inattentional Blindness.Arien Mack & Irvin Rock - 1998 - MIT Press. Edited by Richard D. Wright.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

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