Knowledge of the Self in Berkeley’s Philosophy

International Philosophical Quarterly 6 (2):248-269 (1966)
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Abstract

Given berkeley's view of ideas and spirits and his reference to notions of spirits, Actions, Relations, And ideas, I argue that (a) the doctrine of the notion is his account of knowledge of the self, (b) to have a notion of something is to comprehend it non-Perceptually and actively, And (c) berkeley ultimately holds the self is substantial and knowable. By intuition and principled knowledge we know the self "exists". Notional knowledge is not intuition. The former and principled knowledge presuppose intuition. Notions are conceptual or epistemological "acts". Hence they serve to comprehend and present the self as "active, Non-Sensible, Independently existing subject and spiritual substance". They are "active, Thinking images." finally, I discuss the problems of the nature of the self, Its identity and activity in relation to God and in view of recent commentaries

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