Abstract

Recent efforts to characterize interpretations have typically proceeded by assuming a distinction between what belongs to, or is included in, an art work and what does, or is not. Thus, it has been supposed that there is a criterion of world inclusion for art works. ;I examine two attempts to restrict the notion of an interpretation by appealing to the distinction between what is and what is not included in an art work. Each attempt supposes that on the basis of this sort of characterization of interpretation, it is possible to resolve the logical issue concerning whether interpretations are simply true or false, or logically weak . The view that represents interpretations as claims about what is included in an art work concludes that interpretations are simply true or false, while the view that interpretations are claims about what is not included in a work concludes that interpretations are more or less plausible or reasonable, but not simply true or false. ;I argue that interpretations are logically mixed; some interpretations are simply true or false, while others are logically weak. Thus neither solution of the logical issue succeeds. Furthermore, the failure to solve the logical issue is a result of accepting an inadequate characterization of interpretation. The distinction between what is and what is not included in a work cannot serve as a foil for restricting the notion of an interpretation because, first, this leads to a misconception of the function of interpretation and, second, there are problems inherent to the supposition that there is an adequate criterion of world inclusion for works of art