Spinoza's Moral Philosophy

In Yitzhak Y. Melamed (ed.), A Companion to Spinoza. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 349–364 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Spinoza's moral philosophy was neglected in favor of his views in metaphysics and epistemology. Spinoza's discussion in the Ethics suggests that while ‘good’ and ‘bad’ do not refer to real intrinsic features of things, nevertheless they can bear an objectivist burden. The notion of conatus lies at the heart of Spinoza's moral psychology and theory of motivation. In Spinoza's view, then, human beings are thoroughly egoistic agents. An agent's power or striving may be directed either by random sense experience and the imagination. Spinoza identifies living according to one's own nature with living according to the guidance of reason. Spinoza has shown that all of the human emotions are constantly directed outward, towards things and their tendencies to affect us one way or another.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,990

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
15 (#948,666)

6 months
12 (#304,934)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Steven Nadler
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references