Abstract

Chapter Four uses the concept of an adequate moral theory to evaluate Spinoza's moral philosophy. After isolating four criteria of an adequate moral theory, I attempt to demonstrate that Spinoza's theory can competently meet these standards and that frequently his explanations are superior to the accounts of other moral philosophers. It is this competence in explaining essential elements of our moral experience that warrants a detailed examination of the premises on which Spinoza's moral theory rests. Such an examination must critically survey Part One of the Ethics, a task that exceeds the limits of this dissertion. Finally, it is argued that Spinoza's moral theory cannot be dismissed because it allows the derivation of moral judgments from factual premises until it has been demonstrated that all forms of ethical naturalism, including Spinoza's, are false. ;Chapter Three begins with an examination of adequate ideas and active emotions. Unlike inadequate ideas which are the source of falsehood and error, adequate ideas are true, and insofar as we possess adequate ideas we understand. Ideas and emotions are inseparable, and therefore adequate ideas also possess an effective quality, active emotions. Now, insofar as people possess adequate ideas and active emotions, they experience the same specific desires. Thus, on the basis of adequate ideas it is possible to construct an absolute moral standard. Moreover, since adequate ideas are true, such a moral standard rests upon a firm foundation. Insofar as we possess adequate ideas we realize that the only thing man desires is to preserve in being, and we realize that man does this only insofar as he acts. Man acts only when he understands; therefore, only understanding and that which is conducive to it are certainly useful to man. The good life for man is the life of understanding, and this life includes freedom, the love of our fellow man, and the love of God. ;Chapter Two deals with Spinoza's psychology. Desire in the sense of the conatus is the source of the primary emotions of joy and sorrow. These emotions are the source of specific desires, and since specific desires determine our perceptions of what is certainly useful to ourselves, our emotions determine our moral judgments. For Spinoza, emotions and ideas are inseparable; consequently, the ideas which we possess determine the nature of our moral judgments. Inadequate ideas and passive emotions vary from person to person; therefore, they give rise to specific desires which are not the same for all people. Hence, inadequate ideas and passive emotions cannot provide us with an absolute moral standard. ;The object of this dissertation is an examination of Spinoza's moral philosophy. It attempts to gather from the different Parts of the Ethics Spinoza's mature ethical views and to demonstrate that they constitute a coherent and comprehensive moral theory. ;Chapter One is concerned with Spinoza's metaethical prespective. Initially, Spinoza defines 'good' as 'agreement with an ideal', and when this definition is developed in the context of the rejection of final causes and the doctrine of the conatus, the result is a version of ethical naturalism in which 'good' is defined as 'that which is certainly useful to us'. This metaethical perspective allows Spinoza to account for moral error. However, it does not establish the existence of an absolute moral standard, since if in reality men have different desires, that which is certainly useful to one man may not be certainly useful to others.