Abstract

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This work has two aims, to reveal the status of now at each of the ontological and the epistemological levels of application, through an examination of the relevant competing individual tenets of each of the A- and the B-theories of time; and in doing this, to put forth a theory of time which is founded upon a base different from that upon which either of the traditional A- or B-theories is founded. ;In Chapter I, an ontological/epistemological distinction is drawn between implications of assertions harboured within individual tenets of both time theories. Then, logical connections between, as well as implications of these assertions are explicated. The purpose is to ensure the avoidance of confusion regarding the extent of the compass of the harboured assertions. ;In Chapter II it is proved that the expurgation of now from language through de-tensing is in principle impossible if we are to be certain of retaining the ability to secure successful temporal reference; and thus that now and the A-determinations are a necessity at the epistemological level of thought and talk. ;Chapter III examines possible implications for temporal ontology deriving from our most highly corroborated physical theories. We see that each of the A- and the B-temporal ontologies are compatible with this physics. ;In Chapter IV it is proved that the B-temporal ontology, which is devoid of a now, is incoherent. A now-less world fails to account for certain of our undeniable temporal experiences. ;In Chapter V we see that although a now is needed to make sense of the world, the traditionally advocated A-temporal ontology in which B-relations are in some sense dependent on A-determinations, is also incoherent. It is proved that the A-series requires B-relations in its very structure and thus that not only A-determinations, but B-relations aswell, are vital at both the ontological and the epistemological levels of application. And further, as is also proved, since the required B-relations can neither be reduced to nor derived from the A-determinations, an A-theory of time must invoke B-relations. A new A-theory of time taking A-determinations and B-relations alike, to be both ontologically and epistemologically necessary is proposed