Abstract

Evagrius famously characterises divine nature as γνῶσις οὐσιώδης, ‘substantial knowledge’. In the Alexandrian, Cappadocian, and other intellectual contexts informed by Platonic, Aristotelian, and Philonic thought, characterisations of God as a noetic or intellectual being are fairly common. However, these traditions concur in using the term νοῦς rather than γνῶσις. How can we explain that Evagrius deviates from the metaphysical mainstream? In this paper, I review this question from an historical and systematic point of view. I propose to examine ancient theories of Mind about the function and structure of the νοῦς, compare them to the Evagrian theory, and identify a possible explanation for the substitution of γνῶσις to the νοῦς. Since God is the key element in Evagrius's metaphysics, a clearer vision of the divine essence will help us appreciate the whole system more fully.