Abstract

Boethius offers six different accounts of "person". The first four are accounts of the human person: A human person considered as an individual substance is a unique bundle of accidents. A human person considered as an individual substance is an individuated subject which underlies a unique bundle of accidents. A human person is the one brought to trial, some deed or speech of whom is censured. A human person considered as a rational substance is a composite of rational immortal soul and mortal body. The next is an account of a divine person: A divine person is a correlate who differs from other persons only in relational and not in substantial characteristics. The last is a general account of person, whether human or divine: A person is an individual substance of a rational nature. ;It is argued that the first four accounts do not offer mutually exclusive but rather complementary views of the human person. The fifth offers a radically different account of person, but it does not contradict the first four accounts inasmuch as the first four are accounts of human person, whereas the fifth is an account of a divine person. While the first four accounts are consistent with the sixth account of "person", the fifth and sixth accounts are inconsistent, inasmuch as the sixth entails that a three-personal God be composed of three different substances, whereas the fifth considers God to be three persons in one substance. To rectify this inconsistency, it is suggested that the sixth account be discarded