Abstract

This book is the first volume of a projected three volume work on the philosophy of science. It is devoted to the task of describing the experimental method of discovery as practiced in the physical sciences. In the Introduction, the work is referred to as a handbook and is designed apparently as the first stage in the construction of a theory of scientific investigation. Feibleman breaks down the process of discovery into six more or less distinct stages: observation, induction, hypothesis, experiment, calculation, and prediction and control. Apart from the introduction and a concluding chapter which attempts to classify different kinds of results in the physical sciences, one chapter is devoted to each stage. The contention is that each successive stage, except the last, can be seen to emerge logically from the preceding stage. The book is extremely comprehensive in scope and contains a great deal of information about a wide range of aspects of scientific discovery. This is both a positive and a negative feature. Because of its comprehensiveness, many topics deserving closer examination are passed over quickly, and the various categories and stages which Feibleman employs often seem more or less arbitrary. There are important omissions. Kuhn, Feyerabend and Scheffler receive no mention. One finds oneself asking: what is the point of it all? Feibleman suggests one aim is to synthesize and abstract the method of the physical sciences in order to enhance its deployment in the social sciences. Another aim seems to be to provide some logical or theoretical justification of the procedures of the physical sciences. With respect to this last point, the descriptive classification of this volume is only a beginning. Whether it succeeds or fails must await the subsequent volumes.—M. B.