Conceptual knowledge: Grounded in sensorimotor states, or a disembodied deus ex machina?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):455-456 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

If embodied models no longer address the symbol grounding problem and a conceptual system can step in and resolve categorizations when embodied simulations fail, then perhaps the next step in theory-building is to isolate the unique contributions of embodied simulation. What is a disembodied conceptual system incapable of doing with respect to semantic processing or the categorization of smiles?

Similar books and articles

Embodying Bodies and Worlds.Matteo Candidi, Salvatore Maria Aglioti & Patrick Haggard - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):109-123.
Understanding 'sensorimotor understanding'.Tom Roberts - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):101-111.
The Deus ex Machina in Euripides.R. B. Appleton - 1920 - The Classical Review 34 (1-2):10-14.
Deus ex Machina.Rudolf Arnheim - 1992 - British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (3):221-226.
Sensorimotor activity.Mark Rowlands - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
Violations of sensorimotor theories of visual experience.Bruce Bridgeman - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):904-905.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-10-27

Downloads
427 (#45,800)

6 months
91 (#51,211)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Carlos Montemayor
San Francisco State University
Ezequiel Morsella
San Francisco State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations