Against the Ramsey test

Analysis 64 (4):294-299 (2004)
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Abstract

I argue against the Ramsey test connecting indicative conditionals with conditional probability, by means of examples in which conditional probability is high but the conditional is intuitively implausible. At the end of the paper, I connect these issues to patterns of belief revision.

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Author's Profile

Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

References found in this work

A philosophical guide to conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Logic of Conditionals.Ernest Adams, Ernest W. Adams, Jaakko Hintikka & Patrick Suppes - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (3):609-611.
A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):565-570.
A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):524-526.

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