Abstract

The dissertation concludes that Seneca was not a systematic philosopher nor an outstanding one. He is, however, a serious philosopher. It also concludes that his overwhelming concern for the person making moral progress helped him to make three original contributions to Stoic philosophy: viz., the notion of the interior life, the notion of stirrings of the spirit, and his development in the direction of a faculty of will. ;The fifth chapter deals with two questions. The first is the apparent inconsistency between causal determinism and human freedom. The thesis here is that for Stoic monism the two ideas cannot be reconciled. Every act of the person is ultimately the act of the Logos, of which the human soul is a portion. The second question is whether Seneca develops the concept of willing beyond the knowing-wanting of the Greeks. It is argued that he did. His ideas of tension, of good will, of the sovereignty and immutability of the will of the wise man, all represent something over and above an automatic desire for the good once it is recognized as the good. ;The third chapter gives the Stoic teaching on the affective life. The notion of good emotions is explained. The older Stoic idea of the passions as false judgments resulting in excessive impulses and the later concept of the passions as irrational appetites are discussed. The conflict of chapter one is renewed. The Stoic belief that the passions must be eradicated or completely controlled is defended by Seneca with a strong attack on the Peripatetic notion of moderate passions. Seneca's original contribution here is that of involuntary stirrings of the spirit which are not passions and are not imputable to the agent. ;The fourth chapter deals with the relationship between virtue and reason. Two elements are required for virtue, knowledge and action. The first requires a thorough knowledge of philosophy, including natural philosophy. Everyone is born with an innate desire for virtue and an innate desire for self-preservation. However, early influences are harmful and training, advice, and precepts are important before reason emerges. Once reason does emerge philosophy can play its proper role. The Stoic doctrine of temperament as the result of the relative mixture of the qualities of heat, cold, wet, and dry is explained. ;The second chapter sets forth the Stoic theory of knowledge briefly. The principal ideas of presentation, assent, comprehension, and common notions are explained. Seneca was a dogmatist like the older Stoics, but offers nothing original with respect to knowledge. The bulk of the chapter gives evidence to show that although Seneca was not a systematic philosopher, he was capable of philosophical analysis when the need arose. Finally, the Stoic notion of divination as an inductive process is explained. ;This dissertation examines the rational psychology of Lucius Annaeus Seneca. The pattern is to set forth Stoic teaching in each chapter and to compare that teaching with Seneca's thought. Any original contributions of Seneca are especially discussed. ;The first chapter is concerned with the rational soul as a portion of the Divine Logos. An important question is the relationship of reason to the activities of the human person. The early Stoics held that reason is the ruling principle in man and all actions of the person are attributable to reason. Later Stoics, like Posidonius, held that there are rational and irrational powers in the soul. Seneca is ambiguous. In discussing passions like anger, he holds to the unity of the soul. In discussing topics like death, suicide, and immortality he seems influenced by psychological dualism. His discussion of the interior life is an original contribution on his part to an accepted Stoic doctrine in his emphasis upon and his expansion of the concept