Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):176-189 (2007)
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Abstract |
Mary knows all there is to know about physics, chemistry and neurophysiology, yet has never experienced colour. Most philosophers think that if Mary learns something genuinely new upon seeing colour for the first time, then physicalism is false. I argue, however, that physicalism is consistent with Mary's acquisition of new information. Indeed, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are a priori deducible from lower-level ones, Mary may still lack concepts which are required in order to deduce from the lower-level physical facts what it is like to see red
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Keywords | QUALIA |
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DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.478.x |
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References found in this work BETA
Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
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Citations of this work BETA
Making Room for a This-Worldly Physicalism.Barbara Gail Montero & Chris Brown - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):523-532.
Making Room for a This-Worldly Physicalism.Barbara Gail Montero & Christopher Devlin Brown - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
The Physicalist's Tight Squeeze: A Posteriori Physicalism Vs. A Priori Physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):905-913.
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