Moral positive illusion: self–other valuation difference in moral foundation theory

Ethics and Behavior 33 (8):684-701 (2023)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT People tend to be unable to evaluate themselves accurately in many areas. One such area is their own and others’ morality. The current research explores the self–other moral valuation difference in the context of moral foundation theory. We propose that people generally have a moral positive illusion. Specifically, people overestimate their own morality and underestimate the morality of others. Two studies provide converging evidence that individuals underestimate the average moral valuations of others on the five dimensions of moral foundation theory. In particular, we demonstrate three moderators for moral positive illusion: moral foundation type, gender, and political identity. Specifically, compared with the binding foundations, people have greater moral positive illusions based on the individualizing foundations; compared to men, women have greater moral positive illusions; and compared with liberals, conservatives have greater moral positive illusions based on the binding foundations.

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