Abstract

Practice has been considered as a notion challenging an idea of truth which is neutral to the role of agency or an epistemic role of the subject in accounting for content of thought. Such an idea of truth is a realist notion. However, challenging such a notion does not necessarily mean to reject an idea of normativity of content, i.e. the idea that for content of thought to be possible, it requires both constraints of the world and the subject of thought on content. In order to gain such an account of thought content, a notion of practice is required in the sense that provides an understanding of how the world is made intelligible by having thought which is object-involving. The paper investigates an ontology of practice, the nature of which is characterized in terms of object-engagement. That is to say, an account of the notion of practice requires an account of how norms originating from the interweaving of the world and mind are immanent in practice. On this account, practice provides content because a subject engages with objects in the world.